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Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty
John D. Inazu*
Justice Ginsburg has left an important mark on many areas of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, but she has written relatively little in the area of religion. This relatively
small footprint increased significantly in the opinion that she wrote in the Court's 2010
decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. This Article examines three strands of
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence leading up to that opinion: religion, government
funding of expression, and equality. It first traces Justice Ginsburg’s religious liberty
views through four facets of her legal career: her role as an advocate, her opinions on
the D.C. Circuit, her Supreme Court nomination testimony, and her opinions and votes
on the Supreme Court. It turns next to her views about government funding of
expression. It then examines Justice Ginsburg’s long-standing commitment to principles
of equality. Finally, it considers the interplay of these three strands in Martinez and
offers three observations. First, because Martinez pitted religious liberty against liberal
equality, it forced Justice Ginsburg to make a choice that prioritized one over the other
and may have caused her to overlook some of the religious dimensions of the case.
Second, Justice Ginsburg’s previous views about government funding of speech should
have caused her greater concern over the implications of unconstitutional conditions in
this case. Third, Martinez skirted the preceding tensions, relying instead on doctrinal
intricacies that detracted from the core issues raised in this case.

* Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University. Thanks to Chad
Flanders, Greg Magarian, Susan Appleton, Deborah Dinner, Neil Richards, Kevin Pybas, Chris Lund,
Bryan Lammon, and Neil Siegel for helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this Article. I am
indebted to Professor Joan Williams for inviting me to contribute to this issue and to the editors and
staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their assistance. Thanks to Lila Zhao, Catherine Crane, and
William Osberghaus for excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has left an important mark on many
areas of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, but she has written
relatively little in the area of religion. During her nearly twenty years on
the Court, she has authored only one majority opinion directly
addressing either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause
1
of the First Amendment.
To some observers of the Court’s religion jurisprudence, this
relatively small footprint increased significantly with her 2010 opinion in
2
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. That decision upheld the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law’s denial of “official
recognition” to a student group that limited its membership to Christians
who adhered to a moral code that included a prohibition against
3
homosexual conduct. Although Martinez reads more like a free speech
than a free exercise decision, the case involves some of the most difficult
4
and most troubling aspects of religious liberty today. In particular,

1. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding a provision of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act); see infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg also
wrote the majority opinion in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), a Tax Injunction Act case that
tangentially addressed an Establishment Clause claim. She authored dissents in Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997), and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
3. Id. at 2978.
4. I have written critically of the holding and reasoning of Martinez. See John D. Inazu,
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Martinez’s dismissal of the religious association claim dealt a severe blow
to religious liberty advocates who have struggled to find alternate means
of protecting religious expression in the twenty years since the Court’s
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which lowered the level of
constitutional scrutiny applied to generally applicable, neutral laws that
5
burden the free exercise of religion.
Martinez is bad news for religious liberty, but it need not cast the
definitive gloss on Justice Ginsburg’s views on the subject for at least two
6
reasons. First, the case involves the tension between religious liberty and
Justice Ginsburg’s core concern with equality. Second, Martinez
7
addresses the relationship between expression and government funding,
an area in which the Court has yet to offer much helpful guidance.
Unfortunately, rather than squarely confront these constitutional
tensions, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion moves too quickly past them and
elides her own caution that “[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped,
8
experience teaches, may prove unstable.”
To support these claims, I examine three strands of Justice
Ginsburg’s jurisprudence leading up to Martinez: religion, government
9
funding of expression, and equality. In Part I of this Article, I trace

Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly 5, 145–49 (2012) [hereinafter Inazu,
Liberty’s Refuge]; John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association,
43 Conn. L. Rev. 149, 195–97 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law].
5. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The claim to religious association was strengthened by the Court’s
recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012)
(“[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.”). The Court in Hosanna-Tabor recognized a broad ministerial exception to
employment discrimination law based on a “religious organization’s freedom to select its own
ministers.” Id. Given the religious association interests at issue in both cases, Hosanna-Tabor and
Martinez may be in tension.
6. Only a handful of scholars have ventured an assessment of Justice Ginsburg’s religion
opinions. See, e.g., Kevin Pybas, Religious Groups in a Free Society, 86 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 685, 692
(2009) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 449,
457 (2000)) (describing Justice Ginsburg as adhering to a “weak free exercise/strong establishment
approach”). Kevin Pybas correctly notes that Justice Ginsburg has “endorsed Sullivan’s claim that the
prohibition on establishment affirmatively establishes a secular moral public order.” Id. at 692–93 n.30
(citing Pinette, 515 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 197–214 (1992))).
7. 130 S. Ct. at 2985–86.
8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992).
9. In addition to these three lines of cases, Martinez drew substantially from two others: cases
addressing student groups seeking official recognition at public universities and cases establishing the
doctrinal framework for limited-public-forum analysis. The former precede Justice Ginsburg’s tenure
on the Court and thus do not shed light on her perspectives. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The latter include some cases decided since Justice
Ginsburg has been on the Court, see, for example, Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
533 U.S. 98 (2001), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
but I omit a separate treatment of them for two reasons. First, the doctrinal framework that emerges
from these cases is relatively straightforward: Content-neutral laws generally survive scrutiny, and
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Justice Ginsburg’s religion views through four facets of her legal career:
her role as an advocate, her opinions on the D.C. Circuit, her Supreme
Court nomination testimony, and her opinions and votes on the Supreme
Court. In Part II, I turn to her views about government funding of
expression, relying principally upon her dissent in DKT Memorial Fund
10
v. Agency for International Development. Then, in Part III, I examine
her long-standing commitment to principles of liberal equality. Finally, in
Part IV, I consider the interplay of these three strands in Martinez and
offer three observations. First, because Martinez pitted religious liberty
against liberal equality, it forced Justice Ginsburg to make a choice that
prioritized one over the other and may have caused her to overlook some
of the religious dimensions of the case. Second, Justice Ginsburg’s
previously expressed views about government funding of speech should
have caused her greater concern over the implications of unconstitutional
conditions in this case. Third, Martinez skirted the preceding tensions,
relying instead on doctrinal intricacies that detracted from the core issues
raised in this case.
Martinez should not have prioritized liberal equality over religious
liberty, it should not have avoided an unconstitutional conditions
analysis, and it should not have sidestepped the underlying values clash.
This criticism is not for Justice Ginsburg alone, nor is it limited to the
five-member majority in Martinez. The Supreme Court has for decades
been less than clear about the interrelation among religious liberty,
associational freedom, and government funding. Martinez emerges from
within the murky intersection of these constitutional doctrines. And yet
there is another sense in which this opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg
must be situated within the rest of her own jurisprudence. This Article
begins that effort.

I. Religion
A. Advocacy
One of Justice Ginsburg’s earliest encounters with a religious liberty
claim came with her involvement in the case of Susan Struck, an Air
Force officer who became pregnant and refused on religious grounds to
11
have an abortion. Struck’s refusal to end her pregnancy subjected her to
12
discharge under military regulations. Ginsburg, then general counsel for

viewpoint discriminatory laws generally do not. Second, to the extent that public-forum analysis is
relevant to the issues addressed in this Article, it is encompassed in the religion cases that I address.
See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberger and Good News Club).
10. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
11. Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1972).
12. Id. at 1373–74.
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the Women’s Rights Project of the ACLU, authored the merits brief
13
when Struck’s case reached the Supreme Court. She wrote that “the
challenged regulation operates with particularly brutal force against
women of [Roman Catholic] faith” and “pit[s] [Struck’s] Air Force
14
career against . . . her religious conscience.” Importantly, Ginsburg
insisted, “While the regulation challenged by Captain Struck is not
designed to interfere with religious beliefs, if in effect it does so interfere,
15
it must be supported by necessity of the kind totally absent here.”
It is important not to make too much of Justice Ginsburg’s advocacy
arguments in a case from the 1970s. For one thing, we cannot readily
attribute to her everything that she asserted on a client’s behalf. Yet
there remains a sense in which her descriptions (“particularly brutal
force” and “necessity of the kind totally absent here”) reflect not just the
rhetorical flair of a skilled advocate but also a deeper empathy for claims
of religious conscience.
B. Judge Ginsburg
Prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg sat for
thirteen years on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Her views about religious liberty emerge in three of the opinions
she authored during that time: her majority opinions in Olsen v. Drug
16
17
Enforcement Administration and Leahy v. District of Columbia, and
18
her dissent in Goldman v. Secretary of Defense.
Judge Ginsburg’s first religion opinion came in her dissent from the
19
denial of an en banc request in Goldman. Simcha Goldman, a Jewish
Air Force officer, alleged that a military regulation that prevented him
from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform violated his free exercise of

13. Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178). Although
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Struck’s case for the Ninth Circuit to consider mootness
after the government changed its position on discharging Struck, see Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071,
Ginsburg’s brief remains important and has recently drawn increased scholarly attention. See, e.g., Neil
S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as
Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771 (2010).
14. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 56.
15. Id. Struck preceded the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral laws of general applicability would be subject only to
rational basis review under a free exercise challenge. Id. at 882–90. But because the Air Force
regulation was a federal restriction on free exercise, today it likely would be decided under the
standard set forth in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, a standard similar to the one
upon which Ginsburg relied in her Struck brief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2010) (providing for strict
scrutiny of substantial government burdens on the exercise of religion).
16. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
17. 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
18. 739 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
19. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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20

religion. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where Chief
21
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion denied Goldman’s claim. In
response, Congress enacted legislation to ensure that “a member of the
armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the
22
uniform of the member’s armed force.”
On its way to the Supreme Court, Goldman’s case came through the
D.C. Circuit. After a panel of that court ruled against him, Goldman
23
unsuccessfully sought en banc review. Three judges dissented from the
denial of the en banc petition: Kenneth Starr, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. Judge Starr’s dissent concluded:
It is time to recall that the First Amendment means more than a strong
and free press. It means more than protecting the right peaceably to
assemble. It means more than preventing the National Government
from establishing a state religion. It means the inalienable right of all
our people as free men and women to worship God. That is what this
country is all about. Dr. Goldman has been required to render to
24
Caesar far too much for far too little reason.

Judge Ginsburg, joined by Judge Scalia, excoriated the “‘callous
indifference’ to Dr. Goldman’s religious faith” that “runs counter to ‘the
best of our traditions’ to ‘accommodate[] the public service to the[]
25
spiritual needs [of our people].’” She emphasized that she dissented
26
“[f]or the reasons indicated in Judge Starr’s eloquent statement.” No
longer an advocate, echoes of Struck resounded in Judge Ginsburg’s
Goldman dissent.
Judge Ginsburg next wrote in a religion case three years after
27
Goldman, in Leahy v. District of Columbia. The case involved a free
exercise challenge to the District of Columbia’s requirement that
28
applicants for driver’s licenses provide their Social Security numbers.
The legal analysis in the opinion is unremarkable—it corrects the lower
29
court’s error on an issue of civil procedure. But what is more interesting
about this brief opinion is the empathy that Judge Ginsburg displayed for
John Leahy’s religious beliefs. She took time to explore “[t]he theological

20. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986), aff’g Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 734 F.2d
1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 509–10.
22. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180,
§ 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086 (1987) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2010)).
23. Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 739 F.2d 657, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
24. Id. at 659–60 (Starr, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
26. Id.
27. 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 1047.
29. Id. at 1048–49.
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30

roots of Leahy’s asserted belief.” Instead of dismissing or ignoring those
beliefs, she set forth a careful description of them. As she wrote, the
roots of Leahy’s belief
lie in the New Testament Book of Revelation which, in its thirteenth
chapter, refers to two beasts. Revelation prophesies that those who
receive the mark of the second beast shall be condemned to eternal
damnation. This mark is characterized as a number required for buying
and selling. Leahy avers that “social security numbers have come to
share many of the characteristics of the mark of the beast, and that
social security numbers may therefore be the mark of the beast.” On
that account, Leahy refused to provide his social security number when
31
applying for a driver’s license.

This brief description emerges from within a short and legally
uninteresting case. But it reflects Judge Ginsburg’s recognition that
sometimes assessing a religious liberty claim requires probing the
32
underlying belief.
In 1989, Judge Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Olsen v.
33
Drug Enforcement Administration. Carl Olsen sought a religious-use
exemption from federal drug laws prior to the Supreme Court’s practical
34
end to such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith. Olsen was a
member and priest of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, which boasted
35
a U.S. membership of somewhere between 100 and 200 adherents. As
the government conceded for purposes of the case, the church viewed
marijuana as its primary sacrament, which was to be “combined with
tobacco and smoked ‘continually all day, through church services,
36
through everything we do.’” Olsen and other church members had
received multiple federal convictions for importing twenty tons of
37
marijuana. Following these convictions, Olsen petitioned the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to grant an exemption permitting
38
the church’s sacramental use of marijuana. He raised two arguments:
(1) the Free Exercise Clause required the exemption; and (2) the

30. Id. at 1047–48 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 1048 (citations omitted).
32. Cf. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 181 (1993) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Judge Ginsburg) (“Leahy’s religious belief involved a rejection of
identification with a Social Security number. If he were to use that number to identify himself, he
would very substantially reduce his chances for an after-life. That was his religious belief.”).
33. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1459.
36. Id. (quoting State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1982)); id. at 1460 (“[The DEA] accepted,
for purposes of its decision, that the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church is a bona fide religion with
marijuana as its sacrament.”).
37. Id. at 1459.
38. Id.
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Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause required that the
DEA grant an exemption similar to the one given to the Native
39
American Church for its sacramental use of peyote.
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion for the court rejected both of Olsen’s
40
claims. Quoting from a recent Supreme Court opinion, she observed
that “certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles” can
be regulated when they pose “some substantial threat to public safety,
41
peace or order.” Based upon this language, and finding that importing
marijuana poses a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,”
42
she rejected Olsen’s first argument. Turning to Olsen’s second
argument, Judge Ginsburg observed that “in cases of this character,
43
establishment clause and equal protection analyses converge.” She gave
short shrift to Olsen’s claim, suggesting an apples-to-oranges comparison
between peyote and marijuana: During a seven-year period preceding
the litigation, she noted, the DEA seized nineteen pounds of peyote but
44
more than fifteen million pounds of marijuana.
Even before more recent developments in free exercise
jurisprudence, Olsen is an easy case. Religious arguments for exemptions
from marijuana use laws raise intriguing questions about the nature of
45
religious practice, but as a practical matter, they get nowhere. A broad
cross section of American society would have no trouble concluding that
a group that imports twenty tons of marijuana into the United States
46
poses a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” But Olsen
remains an interesting case that sheds light on Judge Ginsburg’s religious
liberty views. The key insights are buried in her rejection of Olsen’s

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1463–65. Judge Buckley dissented on Establishment Clause grounds, arguing that the
DEA’s denial of Olsen’s exemption request “create[d] a clear-cut denominational preference in favor
of the Native American Church, which has been granted such an exemption.” Id. at 1468 (Buckley, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 1461–62 (majority opinion) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 n.13 (1988)).
The threat in Olsen seemed clear enough,
in light of evidence that in years past, the church’s “[c]hecks on distribution of cannabis to
nonbelievers in the faith [were] minimal,” there was “easy access to cannabis for a child who
had absolutely no interest in learning the religion,” and “[m]embers [partook] of cannabis
anywhere, not just within the confines of a church facility.”
Id. at 1462 (alterations in original) (quoting Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 649, 651 (Fla.
1979)).
42. Id. at 1463.
43. Id. at 1463 n.5 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
44. Id. at 1463.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting a free exercise
defense in a prosecution for marijuana and LSD use); Lineker v. State, Nos. A-8957, A-8967, 2010 WL
200014 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010) (rejecting a free exercise defense in a marijuana prosecution).
46. See Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1461–62.
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attempt to bring the practices of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church
closer in line with those of the Native American Church:
The peyote exemption was accorded to the Native American Church
for a traditional, precisely circumscribed ritual. In that ritual, the
peyote itself is an object of worship; for members of the Native
American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious. Thus
the church, for all purposes other than the special, stylized ceremony,
reinforced the state’s prohibition. In contrast, the Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church, as earlier observed, teaches that marijuana is properly
smoked “continually all day,” as Olsen himself stated, “through
everything that we do.” True, for purposes of the exemption requested,
Olsen narrowed the permission he sought to track the one accorded
the Native American Church. But “narrow” use, concededly, is not his
47
religion’s tradition.

This description suggests two possible angles to Judge Ginsburg’s
approach to religious liberty. The first is her suggestion that a religious
practice that “reinforced the state’s prohibition” on illegal drug use
might for this reason be more amenable to constitutional protection.
Judge Ginsburg’s description could almost be read to suggest that a
religious practice that toes a line closer to the state’s norms might be
intrinsically more worthy of protection. But the disruption that a
religious practice poses to the state’s norms must factor into the weight
of the government’s interest in restricting the practice, not whether the
practice warrants constitutional protection in the first place.
The second insight into Judge Ginsburg’s religious liberty views
appears in the final sentence of the paragraph quoted above. In asserting
that Olsen’s requested exemption fell outside of his religion’s tradition,
Judge Ginsburg purports to know what constitutes that tradition. But
Olsen’s narrowing of his religious practice might represent continuity
with rather than a break from tradition—particularly if the tradition
48
depended upon this narrowing for its survival. This observation is easily
obscured by Olsen’s colorful facts, but it serves as reminder that judicial
descriptions about the content of religious belief can obscure the clash of

47. Id. at 1464 (citations omitted).
48. Frederick Gedicks poignantly conveys this perspective in his description of the Mormon
Church’s decision to abandon its polygamist practices in the face of intense persecution by the federal
government:
When all its efforts failed, the church came face to face with one of the most serious
crises of religious conscience: the choice between faithfulness and survival. . . .
....
. . . Mormons understand their church to exist in the world to do God’s work, and the
church clearly cannot do God’s work unless it exists in the world. For Mormons, then, there
is religious integrity even in compromise and survival.
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas,
42 DePaul L. Rev. 167, 171–72 (1992).
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competing narrative traditions that often underlies religious liberty
49
cases.
C. Nomination Testimony
The Senate confirmed Judge Ginsburg’s nomination to the Supreme
50
Court by a vote of 96–3 on August 3, 1993. As the vote suggests, the
confirmation hearings were relatively uneventful and uncontroversial.
But they coincided with an unprecedented crisis engulfing the Court’s
approach to religious liberty. Three years earlier, the Court had reshaped
its free exercise jurisprudence with its landmark decision in Employment
51
Division v. Smith. Smith announced that claims brought under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would receive only the barest of
52
constitutional protection from “neutral law[s] of general applicability.”
The holding effectively shifted the constitutional analysis of laws
burdening free exercise claims from strict scrutiny to rational basis
53
scrutiny. Smith set off a firestorm and drew fierce reactions from around
the political sphere. On March 11, 1993, Howard McKeon of California
and Dean Gallo of New Jersey introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives that would have reversed the effect of Smith by
54
stipulating a return to strict scrutiny. Eight months later—and three
months after the Senate confirmed Justice Ginsburg’s nomination—
Congress enacted a version of the McKeon and Gallo bill, the Religious
55
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).
The crafting of RFRA over the summer of 1993 meant that tensions
between Congress and the Supreme Court over religious liberty emerged
around the time of Ginsburg’s confirmation process. These tensions were
amplified by three religion decisions released in close proximity to
President Clinton’s nomination of Judge Ginsburg to fill the seat vacated
by Justice Byron White. On June 7, 1993, the Court issued its decision in
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, holding
that the use of public school facilities for after-school religious

49. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 60–68 (1983).
50. Joan Biskupic, Senate, 96–3, Approves Ginsburg as 107th Supreme Court Justice, Wash. Post,
Aug. 4, 1993, at A4.
51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
52. Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
53. See id. at 885 (“To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is ‘compelling’—
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’ contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense.” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))).
54. H.R. Res. 1308, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted).
55. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2010)).
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56

instruction posed no Establishment Clause concerns. Four days later,
the Court announced its opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, which clarified that strict scrutiny would continue to
apply post-Smith when a regulation appeared to single out free exercise
57
for hostile treatment. The following week—three days after Justice
Ginsburg’s nomination—the Court announced its decision in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, a 5–4 ruling that required an Arizona
school district to pay for a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student
58
attending a religious high school. Lamb’s Chapel, Lukumi Babalu, and
Zobrest raised some of the core issues of contemporary religious liberty
claims: use of public facilities by religious groups, express or implied
animus toward religion, and governmental subsidy of religious practice.
The decisions were generally heralded as victories for religious liberty
that reinforced “neutral” or “equal” treatment of religious and
nonreligious expression. Jim Henderson, an attorney for the conservative
advocacy group American Center for Law and Justice, even suggested
that “the [C]ourt has turned a corner on religious freedom and religion in
59
public life.” Law professor Michael McConnell was more circumspect:
Church-state jurisprudence “was a muddle before and it’s a muddle
60
now.”
News coverage drew connections between the recent decisions and
Justice Ginsburg’s nomination. An article in the Christian Science
Monitor the week after the nomination quoted law professor Jesse
Choper as attributing the Court’s ambiguity in religion cases to Justice
White and suggested that Judge Ginsburg could set a new course as “a
61
stronger separationist than White.” New York Times reporter Linda
Greenhouse speculated that “Judge Ginsburg is likely to be substantially
62
more liberal than Justice White” on matters pertaining to religion.
In light of the ongoing push for RFRA and the Court’s recent
decisions in Lamb’s Chapel, Lukumi Babalu, and Zobrest, Judge
Ginsburg’s views about religion cases seemed particularly relevant. In
response to a question from Senator Patrick Leahy during her testimony
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, she emphasized that “[o]ur tradition

56. 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993).
57. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”).
58. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
59. Max Boot, Supreme Court Extends Scope of Religious Rights, Christian Sci. Monitor, June
21, 1993, at 6 (quoting Jim Henderson, Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice).
60. Id. (quoting Professor Michael McConnell).
61. Id. (quoting Professor Jesse Choper).
62. Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term; The Court’s Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and
Starts, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1993, at E1.
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has been one of many religions, one of tolerance and mutual respect.”
When Senator Leahy pressed her about possible tensions between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, Judge Ginsburg responded
with a favorable characterization of the Court’s recent Lamb’s Chapel
opinion:
Some crossovers do not create intractable problems, as the Supreme
Court indicated fairly recently. For example, suppose a school facility
is available after hours. Can the school board say we are not going to
allow a religious group to use the facilities, because we don’t want the
State to be acknowledging religion in any way? The Supreme Court
said if the facility is open on a first-come, first served basis to anyone,
the school’s authorities can’t exclude a group on the ground of religion.
That position does not involve the State in establishing religion.
Instead, it allows room for people freely to exercise their religion, as
64
long as they are not being treated differently from any other group.

In its report accompanying its unanimous endorsement of Judge
Ginsburg’s nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee praised her
“understanding of the values of religious pluralism and tolerance” and
“her approval of the idea that government must accommodate religious
practice in the absence of ‘special circumstances’—an idea directly in
65
conflict with the Smith analysis.” Assessing Judge Ginsburg’s testimony
and her Leahy and Goldman opinions, the Committee concluded that
Judge Ginsburg “shows sensitivity to the problem at the core of Smith
and of modern free exercise clause doctrine—the problem of adjusting
66
government action on religious practice in a pluralistic society.”
D. Justice Ginsburg
The first religious liberty case that Justice Ginsburg confronted on the
Supreme Court was Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
67
District v. Grumet. The case involved an Establishment Clause challenge
to the creation of a school district to facilitate the educational needs of
68
disabled children of Satmar Jews. The majority rejected the school
district on the grounds that it manifested unconstitutional aid to
69
religion. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’ concurrence, which
contended that the school district “affirmatively supports a religious
63. Hearings, supra note 32, at 182; see id. at 212 (“I appreciate that the United States is a country
of many religions. We have a pluralistic society, and that is characteristic of the United States.”).
64. Id. at 180.
65. S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 27 (1993).
66. Id. at 28.
67. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). The discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s votes on the Supreme Court is an
illustrative rather than exhaustive consideration of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases
that have come before the Court during her tenure.
68. Id. at 692.
69. Id. at 690.
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sect’s interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from
associating with their neighbors” and “increased the likelihood that they
70
would remain within the fold.”
The following term, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent
71
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. The
case bears many factual similarities to Martinez. A religious student
group challenged the university’s denial of funding available to other
72
student groups through a student activities fund. Justice Kennedy (who
would prove to be the crucial fifth vote in Martinez) authored the
majority opinion concluding that the denial of funding amounted to
viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum and that the funding
of the religious student group would not violate the Establishment
73
Clause. Justice Souter’s dissent rejected Justice Kennedy’s Establishment
Clause analysis and argued that the Court had abandoned its role of
ensuring that direct aid flowed only to secular activities and not sectarian
74
ones.
Six years after Rosenberger, the Court revisited the relationship
between religious expression, government funding, and the public forum,
75
in Good News Club v. Milford Central School. The case involved a public
school’s denial of after-hours meeting space to a Christian children’s club
76
even though the space was generally available to other private groups.
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion relied on Rosenberger and Lamb’s
Chapel to strike down the denial of meeting space as viewpoint
77
discrimination. As in Rosenberger, the Court found no Establishment
78
Clause concerns. Justice Ginsburg again joined Justice Souter’s
79
dissent.
Justice Ginsburg’s most substantial opinion in a free exercise case
80
came in Cutter v. Wilkinson, which involved a challenge brought under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
81
(“RLUIPA”). The case arose when prisoners incarcerated at an Ohio

70. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
72. Id. at 822–23.
73. Id. at 831, 846.
74. Id. at 873–74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
76. Id. at 102.
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that the school’s policy was viewpoint
neutral because it prohibited the use of school facilities for religious purposes, rather than prohibiting
use by groups with a religious viewpoint, as in Lamb’s Chapel. Id. at 136–39.
80. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
81. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5
(2010)).
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corrections center alleged that they were being prevented from practicing
82
The
nonmainstream religions, including Wicca and Satanism.
corrections center countered that accommodating these religions would
83
violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
held that RLUIPA “does not, on its face, exceed the limits of permissible
84
government accommodation of religious practices.” She quoted
language from Smith emphasizing that the “exercise of religion often
involves not only belief and profession but [also] the performance
of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service
85
[or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine.”

II. Government Funding of Speech
A second strand of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence relevant to this
Article concerns government funding of speech. The complicated
relationship between funding and speech that has emerged in the case
law is affected by two related doctrines: the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions and the doctrine of government speech. The basic premise of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that denying a generally
available governmental benefit (such as funding) is considered a penalty
86
for purposes of constitutional analysis. The basic premise of the
government speech doctrine is that the government may take steps (such
87
as selective funding) to convey its own message. It is not hard to see
why these divergent premises are likely to cause confusion. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, has acknowledged as
much:
Neither the latitude for government speech nor its rationale applies to
subsidies for private speech in every instance, however. As we have
82. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712.
83. Id. at 713.
84. Id. at 714.
85. Id. at 720 (alterations in original) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
86. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 155 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 192–93 (1991) (holding that the failure to fund is not an unconstitutional burden); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (same).
87. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee.”); see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in Johanns concluded that generic advertising funded by a targeted assessment on beef producers was
not susceptible to a First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge. Id. at 562. Justice Ginsburg
concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the assessment was a permissible government
regulation, but wrote separately to explain why she did not view this as a government speech case. Id.
at 569–70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the government did not use its name in the beef
advertising, and in fact affirmatively recommended against overconsumption of beef in its various
dietary guidelines).
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pointed out, “[i]t does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions
are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to
88
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”

The preceding language highlights the tension between government
speech and unconstitutional conditions. But it leaves open important
questions of how we ascertain the government’s motive and how we
assess what constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
Justice Ginsburg’s most explicit views about this area of the law are
found in a partial dissent that she authored while on the D.C. Circuit in
89
DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for International Development. DKT is
not a religion case, but it raises questions about funding and associational
freedom that bear upon many religious liberty cases, including Martinez.
DKT involved statutory and constitutional challenges to restrictions
on abortion funding implemented by the executive branch pursuant to
90
the Foreign Assistance Act. The Act authorized funding for “voluntary
91
population planning,” but prohibited the use of any funds for
92
“abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning.”
The Agency for International Development (“AID”), in accordance with
delegated statutory authority, implemented a requirement that domestic
and foreign nongovernmental organizations certify that they would not
“perform[] or actively promote[] abortion as a method of family planning
in AID-recipient countries or . . . provide[] financial support to any other
93
foreign nongovernmental organization that conducts such activities.” A
consortium of nongovernmental organizations including DKT Memorial
Fund asserted that AID’s policy violated
First Amendment rights by rendering plaintiffs ineligible to receive
population assistance funds because they engage in certain activities
relating to voluntary abortion, including the dissemination of
information, that run afoul of AID’s policy, and by rendering plaintiffs
unable to associate in AID programs with persons or entities whose
abortion-related activities, including the dissemination of information,
94
conflict with AID’s policy.

Judge Sentelle’s opinion for the court addressed DKT’s free speech
and expressive association arguments. Turning first to the speech claim,
he began by insisting that the plaintiffs had mischaracterized as

88. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
89. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 277.
91. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b) (1961)).
92. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3) (1961)).
93. Id. at 278.
94. Id. at 282.
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viewpoint discrimination what was actually just “a refusal to fund.”
According to Sentelle, it was “settled law” that “[t]he fact that the
government subsidizes one constitutionally protected or constitutionally
96
permissible activity is no reason that it has to subsidize another.” AID’s
policy “simply represents an election to fund some communicative and
97
associational acts, while not funding all.”
Sentelle turned next to the expressive association claim. He rejected
DKT’s argument that AID’s hindrance of a joint project between DKT
and another nonprofit “involving much conduct and some expression”
98
violated DKT’s right of expressive association. Instead, “the refusal to
subsidize the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is not
99
tantamount to an infringement of that right.”
Sentelle concluded his freedom of association analysis by discussing
100
the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell. In that
decision, the Court had rejected a freedom of association claim brought
by a Christian college denied federal money because it refused as a
matter of conscience to sign a Title IX compliance document from the
101
Department of Education. Sentelle reasoned that if the Department of
Education could deny funding to Grove City College, then AID could
deny funding to DKT.
102
Judge Ginsburg filed a vigorous partial dissent. In her view, Grove
City College was inapposite because “abortion (or anti-abortion)
counseling is speech sheltered by the first amendment, while
95. Id. at 287.
96. Id. at 288.
97. Id. at 289.
98. Id. at 292.
99. Id. at 293 (citing, inter alia, Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983)).
100. Id. at 294; see Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
101. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 559–60. The compliance document prohibited “discrimination
under any education program or activity for which [the school] receives or benefits from Federal
financial assistance.” Id. at 560–61. The college made clear that “discrimination on the basis of race or
sex is morally repugnant to its principles,” see Brief for Petitioners, Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555 (No.
82-792), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 292, at *9, and there was no indication that it had ever
discriminated on these grounds, see Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., concurring). It argued
that the application of the Title IX restrictions violated its “First Amendment rights to academic
freedom and association.” Brief for Petitioners, supra, at *80. Just two weeks before the college filed
its brief, the Supreme Court rebuffed a freedom of association argument from another Christian
college in a case that pitted religious group autonomy against antidiscrimination norms. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Finding that Grove City College’s freedom of association
argument “warrant[ed] only brief consideration,” the Court tersely concluded that Title IX restrictions
trumped the college’s First Amendment rights: “Congress is free to attach reasonable and
unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that education institutions are not obligated to
accept.” Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion).
102. Judge Ginsburg concurred in the court’s rejection of DKT’s statutory claims. DKT, 887 F.2d
at 299 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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discriminating adversely on the basis of race, national origin, religion or
103
sex is not one’s constitutional right.” She rejected the majority’s claim
that DKT was simply a funding case, insisting that “DKT’s case rests on
the freedom to communicate, to receive communications, and to maintain
104
associations.” She warned that the government was attempting to
“manipulate[] out of existence guaranties [of freedom of speech and
105
association] embedded in the Constitution of the United States,” and
concluded her opinion by asserting that “[t]he handicap our government
has placed on DKT’s speech and associations is repugnant to the first
106
amendment.” Judge Ginsburg’s DKT dissent thus advocated robust
107
protections for freedom of speech and association and resisted funding
108
constraints that inhibit “speech sheltered by the first amendment.” Her
core objection was rooted in the doctrine of unconstitutional
109
conditions.
Judge Ginsburg reinforced the beliefs she expressed in her DKT
dissent during her testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee during
her nomination process. In discussing her views on free speech, she
expressed three core ideas: (1) freedom of expression extends to
110
111
expression that we hate, (2) even nonverbal acts can express ideas,
and (3) “taxing and spending decisions . . . can seriously interfere with
112
the exercise of constitutional freedoms.” As Martinez illustrates, each

103. Id. at 301 n.2 (citation omitted). Turning to AID’s policy, Ginsburg emphasized that
“[t]hrough AID, ‘the United States continues to be the largest single donor of international population
assistance, contributing more than 40 percent of the total $500 million provided by all donors in
1986.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Declaration of John J. Dumm, Deputy Dir. of the Office of Population of
AID, Dec. 30, 1987, at 5).
104. Id. at 303.
105. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S.
583, 594 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 308.
107. Id. at 303.
108. Id. at 301 n.2.
109. Id. at 301 (citing Sullivan, supra note 86). Justice Ginsburg also made an unconstitutional
conditions argument in an amicus brief she filed in a case challenging mandatory periods of maternity
leave for public school teachers who became pregnant. See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973) (No. 72-777), 1973 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
11, at *49 (“While it is true that [a teacher] does not have a constitutional right to continue public
employment, it cannot be gainsaid that she does have a right to be free from the imposition of
unconstitutional conditions in connection with that employment.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96–97 (10th Cir. 1973))).
110. Responding to a question from Senator Leahy, Judge Ginsburg emphasized that “free speech
means not freedom of thought and speech for those with whom we agree, but freedom of expression
for the expression we hate.” Hearings, supra note 32, at 313.
111. Id. at 226 (“It is said that during World War II the King of Denmark stepped out on the street
in Copenhagen wearing a yellow armband. If so, that gesture expressed the idea more forcefully than
words could.”).
112. FEC v. Int’l Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
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of these ideas is also central to any meaningful protections for religious
expression and practice.

III. Equality
The final dimension of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence that
influences her views about religious liberty generally and Martinez in
particular is her emphasis on “equal dignity,” which Professor Neil Siegel
113
has called the “central purpose” of her constitutional vision. He
suggests that “[d]uring her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, thenJudge Ginsburg put the Senate and the public on notice of the core
114
content of her constitutional vision.” As Siegel elaborates, Ginsburg
underscored for the Senators who would be voting on her
confirmation . . . . her belief that the meaning of the Constitution
changes over time, as each generation of Americans seeks to perfect
constitutional ideals that were originally articulated by the Founders.
They perfect these ideals in part by broadening the universe of
beneficiaries—for example, by according women the respect and
opportunities they are due as full-fledged members of the political
115
community.

Siegel’s assessment of Justice Ginsburg’s “constitutional core” has
been borne out in her tenure on the Supreme Court. She shares this core
vision with at least two other recent Justices—Sandra Day O’Connor and
116
John Paul Stevens. But the core concerns of these three Justices also
raise important questions as to what constitutes “the political
community” and the extent to which the state should regulate
nongovernmental actors with the coercive force of law to ensure “respect
and opportunities” for the members of that community. These questions
are particularly important in religious liberty cases, which introduce
competing “counter-assimilationist” ideals that allow people “of
different religious faiths to maintain their differences in the face of
117
powerful pressures to conform.” Justice Ginsburg implicitly recognized
these counter-assimilationist values in the support she showed for

(emphasis removed). Senator Patrick Leahy quoted this language while seeking clarification of an
earlier statement by Judge Ginsburg. Hearings, supra note 32, at 184. Judge Ginsburg indicated that
she continued to adhere to the view she expressed in that case. Id. (“I said yesterday that the
Government can buy Shakespeare and not modern theater. . . . [W]hat the Government cannot do is
buy Republican speech and not Democratic speech, buy white speech and not black speech . . . .”).
113. Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 New
Eng. L. Rev. 799, 816 (2009).
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).
116. See Gregory P. Magarian, Justice Stevens, Religion, and Civil Society, 2011 Wisc. L. Rev. 733,
746 (noting the “central concern with equal citizenship” of both Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens).
117. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1109, 1139 (1990).
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118

Simcha Goldman’s wearing of a yarmulke. But not every religious
liberty case reconciles with her constitutional core as easily as
Goldman—many of the more difficult cases require a more direct
weighing of constitutional values.
The tension between religious liberty and Justice Ginsburg’s
equality commitments is particularly evident in the area of gay rights. We
can glean some insights into her views about gay rights from two key
119
cases decided during her time on the Court: Romer v. Evans and
120
Lawrence v. Texas. In Romer, the Court overturned a voter-approved
amendment to Colorado’s constitution that would have prohibited state
or local government from passing antidiscrimination laws protecting gays
121
In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas law
and lesbians.
criminalizing same-sex sodomy, overruling its earlier decision in Bowers
122
v. Hardwick. Justice Ginsburg joined the majority in both opinions.
Justice Ginsburg also dissented in an important decision that went
123
against gay rights, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Dale involved the
clash between antidiscrimination law and the freedom of association of a
private noncommercial group. The Court sided with the Boy Scouts in
124
their decision to exclude a gay scoutmaster from their membership.
Although Dale was a setback for gay rights, it adopted the precarious
“expressive association” framework first announced in Roberts v. United
125
States Jaycees. I have argued elsewhere that this framework offers little
meaningful protection for private groups that resist antidiscrimination
126
norms. Indeed, absent a change in the Court’s approach to expressive
118. Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
119. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
120. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Julie Nice observes that Martinez reflects the current “moment in time
regarding society’s consideration of gay rights,” which grew out of Romer and Lawrence. Julie Nice,
How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 631,
645 (2011).
121. 517 U.S. at 623.
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
123. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Justice Ginsburg also joined the unanimous opinion in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which the Court held that requiring private
parade organizers to allow the participation of an LGBT group would alter the expressive content of the
parade and therefore violate the First Amendment rights of the organizers. 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
124. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
125. Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)). The Court in Roberts
recognized a distinction between freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive
association. Intimate association “receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). Expressive association, “a right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly,
petition . . . and the exercise of religion,” receives protection only “as an indispensable means of
preserving other individual liberties.” Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
126. See Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law, supra note 4, at 181–97 (illustrating the
weaknesses of the expressive association doctrine).
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association, it may only be a matter of time before Dale is overruled. The
key gay rights cases leading up to Martinez are Romer and Lawrence, not
Dale.

IV. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
The preceding sections have traced Justice Ginsburg’s views on
religion, government funding of expression, and equality (particularly in
the area of gay rights). These areas converged in Martinez. The litigation
leading up to Martinez began in 2004, when the Christian Legal Society
(“CLS”) chapter at the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law in San Francisco sought to become a recognized student
127
organization. Hastings typically granted “official recognition” to private
student groups, making clear that it “neither sponsor[ed] nor endorse[d]”
the views of those groups and insisting that they inform third parties that
128
they were not sponsored by the law school.
Hastings officials withheld recognition from CLS because the
group’s Statement of Faith violated the religion and sexual orientation
129
provisions of the school’s Nondiscrimination Policy. As a result, the
130
school denied CLS travel funds and funding from student activity fees.
It also denied them the use of the school’s logo, use of a Hastings email
address, the opportunity to send mass emails to the student body,
participation in the annual student organizations fair, and the ability to
131
reserve meeting spaces on campus. Hastings subsequently asserted that
its denial of recognition stemmed from an “accept-all-comers” policy that
required student organizations to accept any student who desired to be a
132
member of the organization.
CLS filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of
expressive association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal
133
The court granted Hastings’ motion for summary
protection.

127. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010).
128. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter CLS Brief].
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 19,
2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371).
132. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
133. Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *4.
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134

judgment. CLS appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth
135
Circuit, which affirmed the district court.
After granting certiorari, a divided Supreme Court rejected CLS’s
136
challenge. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion concluded that Hastings’
all-comers policy was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on
137
access to the student-organization forum.” The following pages assess
her opinion in the areas of religion, government funding of speech, and
equality.
A. Religion
Martinez involved a Christian student group that ascribed to a
138
theological creed and met regularly for Bible study and prayer. Justice
139
Ginsburg dismissed CLS’s free exercise claim in a footnote. Of course,
she is not wholly to blame—the conclusion flows almost inevitably from
140
Employment Division v. Smith. But Martinez obscures the values of
religious association—values upon which religious groups had
141
increasingly relied in the wake of Smith.

134. Id. at *1. The district court granted leave for a group called Hastings Outlaw to intervene in
the case. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 131, at 10. Outlaw asserted that its members had a
right to be officers and voting members in any other campus group (including CLS) and that its
members opposed their student activity fees funding an organization that they found offensive. Id. at
10–11.
135. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Truth v. Kent
Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the school district could deny recognition
to a high school Bible club that limited its voting members and officers to those who shared the
group’s beliefs)).
136. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
137. Id. at 2978. Justice Alito authored a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Scalia. Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
138. See CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 5 (“The national Christian Legal Society maintains attorney
and law student chapters across the country. Student chapters, such as that at Hastings, invite speakers
to give public lectures addressing how to integrate Christian faith with legal practice, organize
transportation to worship services, and host occasional dinners. The signature activities of the chapters
are weekly Bible studies, which, in addition to discussion of the text, usually include prayer and other
forms of worship. . . . [T]o be officers or voting members of CLS—and to lead its Bible studies—
students must affirm their commitment to the group’s core beliefs by signing the national CLS
Statement of Faith and pledging to live their lives accordingly.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 6
(quoting CLS’s Statement of Faith).
139. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 n.27 (“CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition
violates the Free Exercise Clause. Our decision in Smith forecloses that argument. In Smith, the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid regulations of
general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. In seeking an exemption from Hastings’
across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it
therefore cannot moor its request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.” (citations
omitted)).
140. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
141. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (concluding that a
school’s exclusion of a Christian group from school premises was “impermissible viewpoint
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Justice Ginsburg concluded that CLS’s speech and association
claims “merged,” which allowed her to resolve the dispute entirely within
142
a free speech limited-public-forum analysis. This merging of CLS’s
speech and association claims reflects a worrisome trend that fails to
make meaningful distinctions between the various rights protected under
143
the First Amendment. It misses the expressiveness inherent in almost
any act of associating, and in this way obscures religious liberty claims
that are tied to associational freedom.
Justice Ginsburg insisted that “CLS’s conduct—not its Christian
perspective—is, from Hastings’ vantage point, what stands between the
144
group and RSO [registered student organization] status.” But CLS’s
145
“conduct” is inseparable from its message. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
misses this connection. Quoting from CLS’s brief, she wrote that
“expressive association in this case is ‘the functional equivalent of speech
146
itself’” to set up the idea that expressive association is entitled to no
more constitutional protection than speech. But CLS had asserted:
[W]here one of the central purposes of a noncommercial expressive
association is the communication of a moral teaching, its choice of who
will formulate and articulate that message is treated as the functional
147
equivalent of speech itself.

CLS was not arguing that association is nothing more than speech
but that association is itself a form of expression—whom it selects as its
members and leaders communicates a message. CLS underscored this
point elsewhere in its brief, arguing that “[b]ecause a group’s leaders
define and shape the group’s message, the right to select leaders is an

discrimination”); see also Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims
in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and DebateDistorting State Action, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 505, 540 (2011). The Court’s recent Hosanna Tabor
decision renews the focus on religious association. See supra note 5.
142. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
143. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981). While Widmar was the first case to
resolve a free exercise claim explicitly through the rights of speech and association, the Court had
previously engaged in similar reasoning. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
634–35 (1943). For an academic argument on these grounds, see Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free
Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71, 94 (2001) (“The free speech doctrine and the newly defined
right of expressive association go a long way to providing an adequate substitute for the Free Exercise
Clause.”). As Steven Smith has observed, “[p]roposals to collapse the commitment to religious
freedom into other values such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection
have proliferated.” Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 239 n.363 (1991).
144. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994.
145. The Supreme Court occasionally evades this distinction. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Inst’l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (“[W]e have extended First Amendment protection
only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”).
146. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (quoting CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 35).
147. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 35.
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148

essential element of its right to speak.” Justice Ginsburg interpreted
this assertion to mean that “CLS suggests that its expressive-association
149
That
claim plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.”
interpretation may be consistent with the understanding of expressive
150
association that has emerged in cases like Dale, but it misses the
fundamental connection between a group’s message and its composition.
Justice Ginsburg’s inattention to religious liberty is also evident in
her rejection of CLS’s distinction between gay “conduct” and the
151
“status” of being gay. CLS insisted that it welcomed members who
were gay but precluded gay or straight students who condoned or
152
engaged in gay sex. CLS also denied membership to students who
153
condoned or engaged in heterosexual sex outside of marriage. The
154
distinction between status and conduct is a familiar one in the law. It is
also rooted in Christian tradition, and in that context it is not limited to
homosexuality—according to most Christian traditions, one can be a
sinner and abstain from a particular sin; one can desire to eat an apple and

148. Id. at 18.
149. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (citing CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 18).
150. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
151. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
152. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 5.
153. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In early 2004, the national
organization adopted a resolution stating that ‘[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the
Statement of Faith, and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual
from CLS membership.’” (alteration in original)).
154. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665–67 (1962) (distinguishing between the
status of narcotic addiction and the crime of illegal drug use); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1938 (2006) (“[A] religious
group (say, a Catholic group) that condemns homosexuality might demand that its members share
those views. Such a demand would be neither religious discrimination nor sexual orientation
discrimination, but only discrimination based on holding a certain viewpoint that secular people could
hold as well as religious ones. But such a group rule wouldn’t just exclude practicing homosexuals, or
at least those practicing homosexuals who believe that homosexuality is proper—it would also exclude
heterosexual Catholics who disagree with church teachings on this issue.”); cf. Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (“On its face the present case does not fall within [the holding of Robinson],
since appellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on
a particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did
in Robinson . . . .”); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2006) (“CLS’s
membership policies are . . . based on belief and behavior rather than status . . . .”); Lofton v. Sec’y of
the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas [the state
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer v. Evans] encompassed both conduct and status, Florida’s
adoption prohibition is limited to conduct.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198,
201 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Black maintains that he has been convicted based on his status as a pedophile or
ephebophile. However, the indictment does not criminalize him in that capacity but simply charges
him for his conduct of receiving, possessing and distributing child pornography that traveled in
interstate commerce.”).
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not eat an apple; one can be gay (or straight) and be celibate. One of the
156
amicus briefs in Martinez emphasized this distinction to the Court.
As Kenji Yoshino has observed, the relationship between status and
157
conduct is also closely tied to gay identity. According to Yoshino,
158
performance (or conduct) is sometimes constitutive of identity. He
elaborates:
Gay status can at times be experienced as existing independently of
homosexual sodomy, as perhaps most clearly seen in the instance of
celibate individuals who nonetheless conceive of themselves as gay.
But gay status can at other times be experienced as constituted by
homosexual sodomy, as perhaps most clearly seen in the instance of
the individual whose homosexual experience leads him to embrace a
159
gay identity.

Yoshino’s description is highly plausible as a sociological or
experiential claim. But its translation into a constitutional norm is less
clear. For Yoshino—whose larger project critiques legal regimes that
encourage a “covering” or hiding of gay conduct—the question is
“whether a commitment against status discrimination might require us to
prohibit discrimination against an act [sometimes] constitutive of that
160
status.” I think Yoshino is mostly right here, but the bracketed qualifier
that I have added to his question is critical to the constitutional analysis.
If conduct were a necessary condition of status, then discrimination
against conduct would be discrimination against status. But that is not
Yoshino’s argument—he is making the weaker claim that conduct is
sometimes constitutive of status. The weaker claim also has an important
corollary: Inaction is also a kind of conduct (or performance) that is
partially constitutive of status. A virgin maintains that status (and
identity claim) through inaction. A gay person who chooses not to
engage in sexual conduct makes an identity claim (cognitively, but also
performatively) that acknowledges both gayness and some other

155. See generally Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament—Community,
Cross, New Creation, A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (1996). The
distinction between status and conduct advanced by CLS in Martinez should not be confused with
either the “nurture” versus “nature” arguments raised by some conservative religious believers or with
certain strands of neo-Thomistic natural law objections to homosexuality.
156. See Brief of Amici Curiae Evangelical Scholars, in Support of Petitioner at 9, Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) (“[A] distinction between inward desires and outward conduct is a
common one in evangelical thinking and would apply in many areas of moral conduct.”).
157. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 778 (2002).
158. Id. at 868. Yoshino advances what he calls the “weak performative model” of identity, id. at
871, which builds upon the work of Judith Butler. See generally Judith Butler, Gender Trouble:
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (2d ed. 1999); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On
the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993).
159. Yoshino, supra note 157, at 873.
160. Id.
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characteristic that modifies gayness (perhaps placing gayness in a
161
subservient role, as with the gay Christian who chooses celibacy).
Once we acknowledge that both action and inaction can be
constitutive of identity, we see why a constitutional pronouncement that
equates status and conduct (like Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in
Martinez) overreaches. It may well be that with respect to sexual
orientation, most gays view conduct as at least partially constitutive of
identity. If that is the case, it should cause us to question a coercive law
of the state (like a sodomy restriction) that purports to prohibit only
162
conduct and not discriminate against status. But this reasoning cannot
be readily exported to all antidiscrimination laws. A private group that
insists upon certain conduct (or inaction) as a basis of membership is not
denying the right of anyone to pursue her performative identity in
society—the constraint is simply that a person who wishes to be a
member of the group must prioritize her identity claims in a way
consistent with the norms of the group. That claim will inevitably
encounter some limits. For example, if a group provided an essential
means of access to core social or economic goods, then we might be
163
concerned about a kind of de facto state action. But CLS at Hastings
College of the Law is not such a group.
Given the essentially private nature of CLS, the effects of its
membership policy, while exclusionary and not without harm, do not
constrict performative identity. In fact, the membership restriction asks
its own kind of performance—a performance of celibacy and denial of
the primacy of sexual identity. In the context of a private group (as
opposed to the public law at issue in Lawrence), it is difficult to conflate a
conduct requirement with one directed at status.
In her Leahy opinion on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg took the
164
time to explore “[t]he theological roots of Leahy’s asserted belief.” Yet

161. While Yoshino recognizes the possibility of prioritizing other identities over gay identity, he
implies that gays who do so are “covering.” See id. at 846 (“Gays can cover by prioritizing their other
identities over their gay identity. Because human beings have many identities, they can cover a
particular identity with the others. The impetus to cover a stigmatized identity with unstigmatized
identities will be particularly strong.”). But unless we remove all agency from prioritizing identities, it
can’t be the case that all instances of subverting gay identity to a different identity (even an identity
like Christian) are problematic.
162. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“While it is
true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely
correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than
conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”).
163. Cf. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge, supra note 4, at 14–16 (“The right of assembly is a presumptive
right of individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups. This right is rebuttable
when there is a compelling reason for thinking that the justifications for protecting assembly do not apply
(as when the group prospers under monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions).”).
164. Leahy v. Dist. of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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in Martinez, she swiftly rejected the theological argument, asserting that
“[o]ur decisions have declined to distinguish between status and
165
conduct” in the context of sexual orientation. Stare decisis did not
compel this conclusion; indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s pronouncement was
widely viewed as a significant development, as evidenced by the
supplemental brief filed by the plaintiffs in the Proposition 8 litigation
166
the day after Martinez was announced.
B. Speech and Money
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that CLS was “seeking what is
167
effectively a state subsidy.” She claimed that “Hastings, through its
RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
168
prohibition.” But this argument elides the fact that, like the plaintiffs in
DKT, CLS’s case “rests on the freedom to communicate, to receive
169
communications, and to maintain associations.” In DKT, then-Judge
Ginsburg warned that the government’s funding constraint was
attempting to “manipulate[] out of existence guaranties [of freedom of
speech and association] embedded in the Constitution of the United
170
States.” She concluded her opinion by asserting that “[t]he handicap
our government has placed on DKT’s speech and associations is
171
repugnant to the first amendment.”
The same principles that led Justice Ginsburg to argue for strong
172
associational protections in DKT are at issue in Martinez. Indeed, one
165. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). Justice Ginsburg relied on two
authorities for the claim: Lawrence v. Texas and Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic. The key
language in Lawrence emphasized that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination.” 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion). The sentence that Justice Ginsburg highlighted
from Bray asserted that “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
166. Letter from Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Counsel for Plaintiffs in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), to Vaughn R. Walker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist.
of Cal. (June 29, 2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/
candce/3:2009cv02292/215270/695/ (“The Court’s holding [in Martinez] arose in response to Christian
Legal Society’s argument that it was not discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather
because gay and lesbian individuals refused to acknowledge that their conduct was morally wrong. The
Court rejected that argument, holding that there is no distinction between gay and lesbian individuals
and their conduct.”).
167. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
168. Id.
169. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583,
594 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. at 308.
172. Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,
2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 105, 110 (“[B]y ignoring the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, [Ginsburg]
allowed Hastings far too much discretion in how it treated its student organizations.”).
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of Justice Ginsburg’s more problematic arguments in her DKT dissent
was her effort to distinguish Grove City College on the grounds that
“abortion (or anti-abortion) counseling is speech sheltered by the first
amendment, while discriminating adversely on the basis of race, national
173
origin, religion or sex is not one’s constitutional right.” That argument
misses the reality that “discrimination” and “freedom of association” are
two sides of the same coin. As Justice Ginsburg herself noted in
Martinez, “[f]reedom of association, we have recognized, plainly
174
presupposes a freedom not to associate,” and “[i]nsisting that an
organization embrace unwelcome members . . . directly and immediately
175
affects associational rights.”
Justice Ginsburg encounters a similar problem with her claim in
Martinez that “[i]n diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished
176
between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits.”
Just as the distinction between DKT and Grove City College cannot hold,
neither can a distinction between “action requiring” and “benefit
withholding” policies. Almost every religion case requires a decision
about whether to grant or withhold benefits. The special education
177
178
services in Kiryas Joel, the newspaper in Rosenberger, and the
179
classroom facilities in Good News Club all drew upon public funding.
While Justice Ginsburg endorsed the funding line in all of these cases,
her attempts to draw different lines are similarly problematic. The
incarcerated adherents of “nonmainstream” religions in Cutter drew
180
upon taxpayer dollars to support their religious practice —as do most
accommodations of religious practice in prisons and military settings. A
religious exemption allowing John Leahy to apply for a driver’s license
without providing his Social Security number would have increased
181
administrative costs funded by tax dollars. In today’s bureaucratic
173. DKT, 887 F.2d at 301 n.2 (citation omitted).
174. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010) (quoting Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Protection
of the association’s right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of
an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of
that voice.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 688 (1980)
(“One of the points of any freedom of association must be to let people make their own definitions of
community.”).
176. 130 S. Ct. at 2986 (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S 574, 602–04 (1983)).
177. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 692 (1994).
178. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995).
179. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
180. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712–16 (2005).
181. See Leahy v. Dist. of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see id. at 1049 n.6 (noting
that the District of Columbia already had in place a system for providing driver’s licenses to foreign
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182

state, money is everywhere. And because the Supreme Court has
183
equated the grant of tax-exempt status with a government subsidy,
presumably the government is subsidizing tens of thousands of religious
and discriminatory organizations.
These questions of funding are difficult, but in working toward a
solution, the answer cannot be that generally available funding equitably
distributed from a common pool means that the government is
expressing a viewpoint or creating an unconstitutional subsidy. If that
were true, then every campus ministry supported by a state-sponsored
school would be violating the Establishment Clause, and every tax
exemption granted to the Catholic Church would violate Fourteenth
Amendment norms against gender discrimination.
Of course, the tensions surrounding Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to
navigate these funding questions are not hers alone. As Julie Nice has
observed, the subsidy issue in Martinez “raises the perpetually troubling
issue of the Court’s inconsistency about when such governmental
184
conditions are unconstitutional.” The interplay between government
speech and unconstitutional conditions creates a seemingly irresolvable
185
tension.
In Martinez, Justice Ginsburg seems conflicted as to the threshold
question of the government’s purpose in the “all-comers” policy. She
notes approvingly that the policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation,
186
and learning among students” and “conveys the Law School’s decision
‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which
diplomats, who lack Social Security numbers).
182. Stark money lines are largely unworkable and “neutral forms of aid” are the norm in
Establishment Clause cases. Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas
Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 Emory L.J. 433, 456 (1995).
183. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (“Every tax exemption constitutes a
subsidy that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
544 (1983) (“A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits”
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380–81 (1998) (“The Court
itself has equivocated, equating tax benefits and direct spending in some constitutional cases but not in
others without indicating a rationale . . . .”).
184. Nice, supra note 120, at 648.
185. In Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004), the Supreme Court concluded that the Free
Exercise Clause did not require the State of Washington to fund theology degrees as part of a
generally applicable scholarship fund. As Douglas Laycock has noted, Locke’s holding is that “when
the state elects to fund a category of private-sector programs, it may facially discriminate against
religious programs within the category.” Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
155, 171 (2004). Laycock observes: “From the perspective of the Court’s cases on claims of a right to
government funding, this holding is not surprising. From the perspective of the Court’s cases on
discrimination against religion, it is remarkable.” Id.
186. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010).
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187

the people of California disapprove.’” These normative assertions
sound like government speech. They also express a viewpoint, which
suggests that the suppression of a contrary perspective would represent a
188
classic case of viewpoint discrimination. But Justice Ginsburg neither
embraces a government speech rationale nor acknowledges the
viewpoint discrimination. Instead, she characterizes the all-comers policy
as “textbook viewpoint neutral” because it applies equally to all
189
groups. The reality, of course, is that progressive groups with open
membership policies will have few problems with an all-comers policy,
but some conservative groups will face significant consequences.
C. Equality
My discussion of Martinez to this point has critiqued Justice
Ginsburg’s neglect of the case’s religious liberty dimensions and her lack
of clarity about the connection between money and speech. There is,
however, a stronger constitutional argument throughout the opinion:
Justice Ginsburg’s core commitment to equal dignity and equality of
opportunity. The normative commitment to equality is the firmest
constitutional grounding for Martinez. But it encounters important
competing constitutional values pertaining to religious liberty and
associational freedom.
Justice Ginsburg may have best reflected her commitments to equal
opportunity in her seminal opinion in United States v. Virginia, which
ended the exclusion of women from state-supported military education
190
at the Virginia Military Institute. But there are strong constitutional
and political arguments that Martinez does not flow inevitably from
United States v. Virginia. Most significantly, the Virginia Military
Institute was a state actor—the message of exclusion was the message of
the state. This was not the case with Martinez. Hastings College of the
Law went out of its way to disclaim any official endorsement of
191
The message of exclusion in
recognized student organizations.

187. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 35, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)).
188. As Justice Souter noted in his Rosenberger dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined:
Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one
message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to
respond. . . . “[When] the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the
First Amendment is plainly offended.”
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 455 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978)).
189. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993.
190. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). Professor Siegel has called United States v. Virginia “perhaps her
most important majority opinion.” Siegel, supra note 113, at 817.
191. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 4.
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Martinez came from a private religious group. In fact, far from reflecting
anything close to a state norm, the views expressed in CLS’s membership
policy run contrary to the reigning orthodoxy of the legal academy, the
overwhelming majority of the faculty and administration at Hastings, and
most of the students who attend the school.

Conclusion
There may be room for disagreement over how we should resolve
the clash of constitutional values at issue in Martinez. But Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion never poses that question. Instead, it mutes the
religious liberty and associational dimensions of the case and further
confounds the Court’s approach to the link between funding and
expression. As a result, Martinez falls short in both scope and execution:
We are left with neither a clear explanation of Justice Ginsburg’s
equality commitments nor a plausible reason for ignoring the claims to
religious expression and religious association.
In August 2011, the Ninth Circuit relied on Martinez to suggest that
a public university might be able to deny official recognition to Christian
student groups because “their members and officers profess a specific
192
religious belief, namely, Christianity.” That is in some ways the logical
conclusion of Martinez, and it is cause for alarm. In the area of religious
freedom, we are better served by an appreciation for the importance of
religious practice and a concern for the ways in which limits on
government funding can constrain constitutional freedoms—the very
commitments that Justice Ginsburg showed us prior to Martinez.

192. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2011); see Truth v.
Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008) (“States have the constitutional authority to enact
legislation prohibiting invidious discrimination. . . . [W]e hold that the requirement that members [of a
high school Bible club] possess a ‘true desire to . . . grow in a relationship with Jesus Christ’ inherently
excludes non-Christians . . . [thus violating] the District’s non-discrimination policies . . . .”).

